Abstract
Introduction
Although availability is often considered one of the three key aspects of information security (along with confidentiality and integrity), availability assurance has been largely divorced from other security concerns. This paper starts to bridge the gap by giving a single, common framework for reasoning about confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
The first part of this framework is a language for specifying confidentiality, integrity, and availability policies. This policy language extends the decentralized label model [21] , and thus is able to describe security policies involving mutually distrusting principals.
The second part of the framework is a semantics for the policy language, which characterizes precisely what it means for a system to enforce a policy. In the context of confidentiality and integrity, end-to-end security policies have generally been interpreted as information flow policies requiring that the system obey noninterference [9] . As this paper shows, availability policies too can be interpreted as requiring a form of noninterference.
The third part of the framework is a static program analysis for enforcing confidentiality, integrity, and availability policies. Previous work has shown that it is possible to enforce end-to-end confidentiality and integrity properties by static, compile-time analysis of program text (for a survey see [24] ). What is new here is a demonstration that the same approach applies to availability: an availability analysis can be expressed in tractable form as a programming language type system that also enforces confidentiality and integrity.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the new policy language for expressing requirements for availability, integrity, and confidentiality. Section 3 instantiates this label system as program annotations in a simple programming language. Section 4 uses the operational semantics of the language to express trace-based security properties that correspond to availability, integrity, and confidentiality policies. Section 5 gives a type system for this programming language and states the corresponding security theorem: well-typed programs are semantically secure. Section 6 extends the simple programming language to express richer notions of availability and also to describe some aspects of distributed systems. Section 7 discusses related work, and Section 8 concludes.
Availability policies
We begin by precisely defining what is meant by "availability"; then we define an expressive policy language for availability, and we demonstrate the policy language can be used for confidentiality and integrity too.
Availability
A system output is considered to be available if it will be produced eventually. The output does not have to be correct-that is the province of integrity.
There are two common ways to specify availability. The first approach is to quantify system reliability using measurable criteria, such as the failure probability or the MTTF/MTTR (mean time to fail / mean time to recover) ratio [27] . The second approach is to specify failure factors (factors that could cause the system to fail), for example, the minimum number of host failures needed to bring down the system [25] . We adopt this second approach here.
The above description of availability glosses over another aspect of availability: timeliness. How soon does an output have to occur in order to be considered to be available? For real-time services, there may be hard time bounds beyond which a late output is useless. Reasoning about how long it takes to generate an output adds considerable complexity, so for now let us consider an output to be available if it arrives eventually. Section 6 presents an extension to this framework that supports reasoning about timeliness.
Failures and principals
We assume that the unavailability of a system output is attributed to a failure. There are many kinds of possible failures: for example, hardware failures such as losing power, software failures such as subversion by an attacker, and human failures such as a user who provides incorrect or even malicious inputs. Our goal is a policy language that can describe all these kinds of failures and how the availability of the system should be affected by them.
We consider a failure to be the malfunction of a principal, an entity that may affect the behavior of a system. Therefore, a failure can be denoted by the responsible principal. For some failures, the corresponding principal is simply an abstract name, which might represent hardware, users, attacks or defense mechanisms, as shown in the following examples:
ÔÓÛ Ö: the main power supply of a system, whose failure may bring down the entire system. ÖÓÓØ: the "superuser", which has the ability to control (or shut down) a system, and to act on behalf of users.
ÓË ½¼¼¼ : a distributed denial of service attack launched from 1000 machines. This principal can be used to specify the availability of a system that tolerates DDoS attacks launched from fewer than 1000 machines.
ÔÙÞÞÐ : the puzzle generated by a puzzle-based defense mechanism [13] for DoS attacks. This principal fails if attackers can feasibly solve the puzzle and launch DoS attacks successfully.
More complex failure scenarios are described by using composite principals [1] . For example, suppose that there is a principal ÙÔ× representing a back-up power supply. And to make the system unavailable, both ÔÓÛ Ö and ÙÔ× need to fail. This joint failure is represented by a composite principal given by the conjunction ÔÓÛ Ö ÙÔ×.
More generally, principals Ô may be constructed using conjunction and disjunction operators and :
The notation is an abstract name representing a principal. The composite principal Ô ½ Ô ¾ represents a joint failure factor: Ô ½ Ô ¾ fails only if both Ô ½ and Ô ¾ fail. Another constructor is used to construct a group (disjunction): principal Ô ½ Ô ¾ represents a failure that happens if either Ô ½ or Ô ¾ fails. For example, the principal ÖÓÓØ ÔÓÛ Ö can make a system fail if the superuser and the power supply each can cause the failure.
To demonstrate the expressiveness of this principal language, we specify the availability of a quorum system [17] . A quorum system is a collection É ½ É Ò of sets (quorums) of hosts, every two of which intersect. A quorum system is available as long as there is some quorum in which no hosts fail. Therefore, a quorum system cannot tolerate the failure of a set of hosts such that for every quorum É , É is not empty. Thus, if the principal represents a host, availability of a quorum system can be specified by the principal
Principal hierarchy
We write Ô ½ Ô ¾ if the principal Ô ½ acts for another principal Ô ¾ -that is, Ô ½ has all the powers of Ô ¾ and is at least as trustworthy [21] . Interpreting principals as failure factors, this means the failure of Ô ½ is worse than the failure of Ô ¾ (or the same). The acts-for relation is useful for analyzing availability, because Ô ½ Ô ¾ means that the availability represented by Ô ½ is at least as high as the availability represented by Ô ¾ . For example, if hosts ½ and ¾ are two principals, then ½ ¾ ½ holds because ½ fails if both ½ and ¾ fail. And information with the availability ½ ¾ also achieves the availability ½ , because if ½ does not fail, ½ ¾ does not fail.
The acts-for relation between principals creates a principal hierarchy À, an ordering (actually, a pre-order) on the set of principals. By the definition of acts-for, a principal hierarchy must satisfy the following deductive rules:
Owned policies
An end-to-end availability policy specifies the availability that a user requires of a system input or output. In this work, availability is specified as a principal representing a failure factor. Accordingly, an availability policy has the form Ù Ô, where principal Ù is the policy owner (the user who specifies the policy), and principal Ô represents the required availability. For example, if Alice specifies the availability policy Ð ½ ¾ on one of her files, it means that Alice requires the file to be available if hosts ½ and ¾ do not both fail.
In general, security (including availability) rests on assumptions. In particular, the enforcement of a policy owned by user Ù is contingent on the assumptions made by Ù. For example, system security commonly depends on a trusted computing base (TCB). If the assumption that the TCB is trustworthy is false, security may not be enforced. In a system with mutual distrust, such as a distributed system crossing administrative domains, different users might assume different components of the system trustworthy. Thus it is important to specify policy owners explicitly to indicate whose assumptions are relevant to policy enforcement.
We build on the decentralized label model (DLM) [21] , which applies the notion of policy ownership to confidentiality and integrity. In the DLM, a confidentiality or integrity policy has the form Ù Ô ½ Ô Ò , meaning that Ù allows only principals Ô ½ Ô Ò to read or update the information protected by the policy. Using disjunctive principals, the policy Ù Ô ½ Ô Ò can be written in the form Ù Ô ½ Ô Ò , just like an availability policy. Furthermore, for each security property (confidentiality, integrity or availability), a policy Ù Ô can be interpreted as an assumption by Ù that Ô does not fail. A confidentiality policy Ù Ô means that Ù requires the data will remain confidential as long as Ô does not fail to keep it confidential. For integrity, Ù requires the data will have integrity unless Ô fails to provide correct data. As an availability policy, it says that Ù requires that the data is available if Ô does not fail.
Based on this commonality, we can separate a notion of owned policies from the security properties these policies apply to. Let abstractly represent a security property of the system; it may be a confidentiality, integrity, or availability property. Formally, we treat as an abstract proposition that is true if the corresponding security property holds, and false otherwise. In general, if the policy Ù Ô is applied to a security property , it means that Ù requires to hold if Ô does not fail.
Treating owned policies separately from the underlying, abstract security properties is useful for two reasons. First, it enables a uniform semantics for security policies. Second, it may in general be infeasible to formally specify or analyze what it means for a security property to hold, particularly if the security violation might occur outside the computing system; some form of abstraction is needed. This abstraction does not create a problem for security enforcement as long as the dependencies between security properties induced by a computing system can be analyzed precisely.
Policy semantics
Whether the policy Ù Ô is applied to confidentiality, integrity, or availability properties, it corresponds to two security assumptions: that Ô does not fail, and the assumptions made by Ù are true. 
Consequently, composite principals satisfy the following conditions:
In addition, we assume there exists an assumption configuration ¦ that maps each principal Ù to its assumptions ¦´Ùµ. In general, if Ù ½ Ù ¾ , then any assumption made by Ù ½ is considered an assumption made by Ù ¾ . Consequently, ¦ must satisfy the following condition:
A security policy can be given a formal semantics in terms of these propositions. Using brackets ¡ to indicate the semantic function, the meaning of a policy Ù Ô is:
Ù Ô ¦ Ùµ ok Ô 
Dependency analysis and policy ordering
A system processes inputs and produces outputs, creating dependencies between security properties of those inputs and outputs. Such dependencies capture influences of the system on security and induce constraints on security policies. For example, consider a system running the following pseudo-code: From the semantics of policies and conditions (1) and (2) in Section 2.5, the following rule for ordering policies immediately follows:
Combining owned policies
In general, different principals may have different security requirements. It is convenient to incorporate the security policies of several principals into one entity so that they can be analyzed and manipulated together. This is accomplished by writing a set of policies ¬ È ½ È Ò , where each È is an owned policy Ù Ô applied to the same security property.
A combined policy ¬ is enforced if and only if all the policies in ¬ are enforced. As a result, the security assumption described by ¬ must be weaker than or equal to the security assumptions described by policies in ¬. Therefore, the semantics of ¬ is the proposition ¬ Ï È ¾¬ È . Just as with simple policies, combined policy ¬ ¾ is as strong as
From the semantics, the ordering on policies can be lifted up to an ordering on combined policies by the following rule:
Importantly, the set of all the combined policies form a lattice with the following join (Ø) and meet (Ù) operations:
The join and meet operations are sound with respect to the policy semantics, because it is easily shown that
Having a lattice of policies supports static program analysis [7] . For example, consider an addition expression ½ · ¾ . Let ´ ½ µ and ´ ¾ µ represent the availability policies of the results of ½ and ¾ . Since the result ½ · ¾ is available if and only if the results of ½ and ¾ are both available, we have ´ ½ · ¾ µ ´ ½ µ and ´ ½ · ¾ µ ´ ¾ µ. Because the policies form a lattice, ´ ½ · ¾ µ ´ ½ µ Ù ´ ¾ µ is the least restrictive availability policy we can assign to the result of ½ · ¾ . Dually, if ´ ½ µ and ´ ¾ µ are the confidentiality policies of ½ and ¾ , then
The least restrictive confidentiality policy that can be assigned to the re-
Security labels
In general, a system will need to simultaneously enforce policies for confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information it manipulates. These policies can be applied to information as security labels. A label is written as a triple ¬ ¬ Á ¬ , where ¬ represents the (possibly combined) policy for confidentiality, ¬ Á represents the integrity policy, and ¬ represents availability. The notations ´ µ, Á´ µ, and ´ µ represent the confidentiality, integrity, and availability components of .
For example, suppose expression ½ has a security label
Applying policies to computation
In this paper, a system is modeled by a program with which users (including attackers) can interact only by affecting its inputs and observing its outputs. Security policies, including confidentiality, integrity and availability policies, are specified on the inputs and outputs of a program. This section shows this approach with a simple programming language.
Security model
The security model in this paper makes two assumptions so that security policies in a system can be enforced by noninterference. One assumption specifies which policies are already enforced, and the other limits the power of attackers.
Our goal is to ensure that a program does not allow attackers to violate its security policies at run time. A program itself has no influence on how its inputs are generated or how its outputs are used by external users. Therefore, a program is not responsible for the enforcement of the integrity and availability policies of its inputs, or the confidentiality policies of its outputs. Therefore, we have the following security assumption: SA1 Confidentiality policies specified on outputs, and integrity and availability policies specified on inputs are already enforced.
We are interested in the security violations that may be caused by attackers, and we assume that the power of an attacker is limited to affecting the inputs and observing the outputs of a system. This leads to our second assumption:
SA2 If the integrity or availability of an output is compromised by attackers, it is because the integrity or availability of some input is compromised by attackers.
By (SA1) and (SA2), the availability policy Ó specified on an output Ó can be enforced by a noninterference property: the availability of the output Ó is not interfered with by the availability of any input whose availability policy is not as strong as Ó , or by the value of any input whose integrity policy is not as strong as Ó .
Indeed, suppose the output Ó is made unavailable by attackers. By (SA2), it is because the availability or integrity of some input is compromised by attackers. Without loss of generality, suppose the availability of is compromised. Let be the availability policy of . By (SA1), is enforced, which, plus the unavailability of , implies that is false. By the noninterference property, we have Ó , which implies Ó µ . Thus, Ó is false because is false. Therefore, the unavailability of Ó implies that Ó is false. In other words, if Ó is true, then Ó must be available, which means that Ó is enforced.
One advantage of enforcing an availability policy by noninterference is to avoid proving that a program will eventually produce an output, which generally amounts to solving the halting problem.
The Aimp programming language
It is well known that confidentiality and integrity policies can be enforced by static program analyses that ver-
ify whether a program satisfies a noninterference property [30, 11, 32] . Since availability policies also correspond to a noninterference property in our security model, a static program analysis can be used to determine whether a system satisfies these policies. We now demonstrate this approach by formally representing the system as a program written in a security-typed imperative language called Aimp.
The Aimp language is a basic imperative language with assignments, sequential composition, conditionals and loops. What distinguishes Aimp from other security-typed imperative languages [30] 
Operational semantics
The small-step operational semantics of Aimp is given in Figure 2 . Let Å represent a memory that is a finite map from locations to values (including ÒÓÒ ), and let × Å be a machine configuration. Then a small evaluation step is
The evaluation rules (S1)-(S6) are standard for an imperative language. Rules (E1) and (E2) are used to evaluate expressions. Because an expression has no side-effect, we use the notation Å · Ú to mean that evaluating in memory Å results in the value Ú. Rule (E1) is used to evaluate dereference expression Ñ. In rule (E2), Ú ½ · Ú ¾ is computed using the following formula:
Rules (S1), (S4) and (S5) show that if the evaluation of configuration × Å depends on the result of an expression , it must be the case that Å · Ò. In other words, if Å · ÒÓÒ , the evaluation of × Å gets stuck.
Examples
By its simplicity, the Aimp language helps focus on the essentials of an imperative language. Figure 3 shows a few code segments that demonstrate various kind of availability dependencies, some of which are subtle. In all these examples, Ñ Ó represents an output, and its initial value is ÒÓÒ .
All other references represent inputs.
In code segment (A), if Ñ ½ is unavailable, the execution gets stuck at the first assignment. Therefore, the availability of Ñ Ó depends on the availability of Ñ ½ .
[E1 ]
In code segment (B), the Û Ð statement gets stuck if Ñ ½ is unavailable. Moreover, it diverges if the value of Ñ ½ is positive. Thus, the availability of Ñ Ó depends on both the availability and the value of Ñ ½ .
In code segment (C), the statement does not terminate if Ñ ½ is positive, so the availability of Ñ Ó depends on the value of Ñ ½ .
In code segment (D), Ñ Ó is assigned in one branch of the statement, but not in the other. Therefore, when the statement terminates, the availability of Ñ Ó depends on the value of Ñ ½ . Moreover, the program executes a Û Ð statement that may diverge before Ñ Ó is assigned value 2. Therefore, for the whole program, the availability of Ñ Ó depends on the value of Ñ ½ .
Noninterference properties
This section formalizes the noninterference properties (in particular, availability noninterference) that correspond to the security policies of Section 2. Although this formalization is done in the context of Aimp, it can be easily generalized to other state transition systems.
For both confidentiality and integrity, noninterference has a simple, intuitive description: equivalent low-confidentiality (high-integrity) inputs always result in equivalent low-confidentiality (high-integrity) outputs. The notion of availability noninterference is more subtle, because an attacker has two ways to compromise the availability of an output. First, the attacker can make an input unavailable and block the computation using the input. Second, the attacker can try to affect the integrity of control flow and make the program diverge (fail to terminate). In other words, the availability of an output may depend on both the integrity and availability of an input. The observation is captured by this intuitive description of availability noninterference:
With all high-availability inputs available, equivalent high-integrity inputs will eventually result in equally available high-availability outputs.
As far as we are aware, no previous work has proposed a notion of noninterference between the availability of outputs and both the integrity and availability of inputs. This formulation of noninterference provides a separation of concerns (and policies) for availability and integrity, yet prevents the two attacks discussed above.
The intuitive concepts of high and low security are based on the power of the potential attacker, which is represented by a base label Ä. In the DLM, suppose the attacker is able to act for principals Ô ½ Ô Ò , and that there exists a top principal (denoted by £) that acts for every principal. Then we have Ä ß£ Ô ½ Ô Ò , because Ô ½ Ô Ò is the most powerful principal that the attacker controls. Given a base label ¬, if ¬ Ä then the label represents a lowsecurity level that is not protected from the attacker. Otherwise, ¬ is a high-security label.
For an imperative language, the inputs of a program are just the initial memory, and the outputs are the observable aspects of a program execution, which is defined by the observation model of the language. In Aimp, we have the following observation model:
Memories are observable. Based on the definitions of memory indistinguishability, we can define trace indistinguishability, which formalizes the notion of equivalent outputs. First, we assume that users cannot observe timing. As a result, traces Å Å and Å look the same to a user. In general, two traces Ì ½ and Ì ¾ are equivalent, written Ì ½ Ì ¾ , if they are equal up to stuttering, which means the two traces obtained by eliminating repeated elements in Ì ½ and Ì ¾ are equal. For example, Å ½ Å ¾ Å ¾ Å ½ Å ½ Å ¾ . Second, Ì ½ and Ì ¾ are indistinguishable, if Ì ½ appears to be a prefix of Ì ¾ , because in that case, Ì ½ and Ì ¾ may be generated by the same execution. Given two traces Ì ½ and Ì ¾ of memories with respect to , let Ì ½ Ä Ì ¾ denote that the lowconfidentiality parts of Ì ½ and Ì ¾ are indistinguishable, and Ì ½ Á Ä Ì ¾ denote that the high-integrity parts of Ì ½ and Ì ¾ are indistinguishable. These two notions are defined as follows: Note that two executions are indistinguishable if any two finite traces generated by those two executions are indistinguishable. Thus, we can still reason about the indistinguishability of two nonterminating executions, even though Á Ä and Ä are defined on finite traces.
With the formal definitions of memory indistinguishability and trace indistinguishability, it is straightforward to formalize confidentiality noninterference and integrity noninterference: Note that this confidentiality noninterference property does not treat covert channels based on termination and timing. Static control of timing channels is largely orthogonal to this work, and has been partially addressed elsewhere [28, 2, 23] .
Definition 4.7 (Integrity noninterference). A program ×
has the integrity noninterference property w.r.t. a typing assignment , written AEÁ Á´× µ, if for any two traces Ì ½ and Ì ¾ generated by evaluating × Å ½ and × Å ¾ , we have that
Consider the intuitive description of availability noninterference. To formalize the notion that all the highavailability inputs are available, we need to distinguish input references from unassigned output references. 
Security typing and soundness
The type system of Aimp is designed to ensure that any well-typed Aimp program satisfies the noninterference properties defined in Section 4. For confidentiality and integrity, the type system performs a standard static information flow analysis [7, 30] . For availability, the type system tracks the set of unassigned output references and uses them to ensure that availability requirements are not violated.
To track unassigned output references, the typing environment for a statement × includes a component Ê, which contains the set of unassigned output references before the execution of ×. The typing judgment for statements has the form: Ê pc × ×ØÑØ Ê ¼ , where is the typing assignment, and pc is the program counter label [6] used to track security levels of the program counter. The typing judgment for expressions has the form Ê
The typing rules are shown in Figure 5 . 
If the value of is unavailable, the assignment Ñ will get stuck. Therefore, rule (ASSIGN) has the premise This type system satisfies the subject reduction property. Moreover, we can prove that any well-typed program has confidentiality, integrity and availability noninterference properties. These results are formalized in the following two theorems (see the technical report [34] for the proofs). 
Extensions
This section describes two language extensions that can be used to reduce availability dependencies and allow a program to use low-availability data in a more flexible and practical way.
Timeout
Timeouts can effectively turn a blocking operation into a non-blocking operation, and thus provide a strong availability guarantee for a computation that uses low-availability inputs. To support timeouts, we introduce two syntax extensions to Aimp: timed integer values and a race expression.
Values Ú Ò Ø

Expressions
½ ¾
A timed integer Ò Ø is similar to integer Ò except that it would take Ø units of time to use this value. A race expression ½ ¾ evaluates ½ and ¾ at the same time and returns the result of the expression that finishes first. If both ½ and ¾ finish at the same time, the result of ½ would be the final result. Suppose we want to set a timeout Ø for expression so that if the evaluation of does not finish in Ø units of time, a default value Ò is returned as the result of . This can be implemented by the expression Ò Ø . Using the timeout mechanism, the following program implements an auction for two clients Alice and Bob. Reference Ñ represents Alice's bid, and Alice has 30 units of time to make a bid, otherwise time runs out, and ¼ is returned as her bid. Similarly, Bob also has 30 units of time to make a bid. Even though the result of this auction depends on the bids of Alice and Bob, the availability of the auction result is not affected by them.
6.1.1. Operational semantics. Note that value Ò can be treated as a syntax sugar for Ò ¼ . As a result, the evaluation rules in Figure 2 can be adapted to the timeout extension by replacing any occurrence of Å · Ò with a more general form Å · Ò Ø . For example, the adapted rule (S1) is shown below:
In addition, the formula for computing Ú ½ · Ú ¾ in rule (E2) also needs to be adapted to this more general form of values:
The operational semantics of the race expression is given by the following rules (E3)-(E5). Suppose ½ and ¾ are evaluated to Ò ½ Ø ½ and Ò ¾ Ø ¾ , which means evaluating ½ and ¾ takes Ø ½ and Ø ¾ units of time, respectively. Thus, if
, the result of ½ should be the final result, and if Ø ½ Ø ¾ (E4), Ò ¾ Ø ¾ is the final result. Rule (E5) applies when only the result of one expression is available.
Typing. The race expression is essential for the timeout mechanism to provide strong availability guarantees. Consider a race expression ½ ¾ . According to rule (E5), the result of expression ½ ¾ is available as long as the result of ½ or ¾ is available. Therefore, the availability of is as high as the availability of ½ and ¾ . Let ´ µ represent the availability label of . Then we have ´ ½ ¾ µ ´ ½ µØ ´ ¾ µ. On the other hand, the value of ½ ¾ depends on the availability and timing of both ½ and ¾ . Consequently, an attacker can try to compromise the integrity of ½ ¾ by compromising the availability or timing of ½ or ¾ . Intuitively, the race expression trades integrity for availability.
To take into account attacks on timing, a security label may contain a new base label component ¬ Á Ì (Á Ì stands for integrity of timing), and Á Ì µ is used to retrieve the component in . Suppose expression has a label , and the result of is Ò Ø . Then an attacker with a security level Ä can affect the value of Ø if and only if Á Ì µ Ä.
Suppose ½ and ¾ have type ÒØ ½ and ÒØ ¾ , respectively. Then ½ ¾ has type ÒØ ½ ¾ , where ½ ¾ is a label computed from ½ and ¾ . Based on the above discussion, we have the following: Because the timeout mechanism trades integrity for availability and allows attackers to compromise the integrity of an output by affecting the availability or timing of an input, the definition of integrity noninterference needs to be adapted to these new risks. Intuitively, the adapted integrity noninterference would require two sets of inputs Å ½ and Å ¾ to generate equivalent high-integrity outputs, if the high-integrity parts, the availability of the high-availability parts and the timing of the high-integrity-of-timing parts of Å ½ and Å ¾ are indistinguishable. The formal definition is given below, following the definition of the memory indistinguishability with respect to the integrity of timing: 
Run-time reference generation
For a program × in Aimp, the set of outputs that × is expected to generate are statically determined by a set of references Ê. However, in some realistic applications, an output may be expected only after control reaches certain program points. For example, consider a simple service that responds to the request from a client. The response is expected only after the service receives a client request. To express such kind of availability requirements, we extend Aimp with a Ò Û statement that creates a new reference in memory. Intuitively, the output represented by this reference is expected by users only after the point where it is created. The syn- Consider the simple service example. In Aimp, a straightforward implementation is shown below:
where Ñ ½ represents the client request, and Ñ ¾ represents the output generated by the server in response to the client request. This implementation is problematic because the availability of Ñ ¾ depends on that of Ñ ½ . In practice, we can imagine that the availability labels of Ñ ½ and Ñ ¾ are ß ¶ Ð ÒØ and ß ¶ × ÖÚ Ö , respectively, where Ð ÒØ represents the client machine, and × ÖÚ Ö represents the server machine. However, in general, Ð ÒØ does not act for × ÖÚ Ö, and thus ß ¶ × ÖÚ Ö ß ¶ Ð ÒØ . Therefore, the above program is not well-typed in practice.
With the Ò Û statement, the simple service can be implemented by the following program in which the server response is represented by a reference variable Ü instead of a memory location. Since Ü is created after Ñ ½ is dereferenced, the availability of Ü does not depend on that of Ñ ½ .
6.2.1. Operational semantics. Formally, the following rule is used to evaluate the Ò Û statement:
[S7 ]
The function newloc´Å Ü µ deterministically returns a fresh reference Ñ such that Ñ ¾ dom´Å µ. The observability and integrity of the newly created reference are specified by a label Ü . To associate a memory reference with its label, we assume there exists a map ª from the memory space Å (an infinite set of memory locations) to labels. Given a label , let Å Ñ Ñ ¾ Å ª´Ñµ . In addition, we assume that for any , Å is infinite. The function newloc´Å Ü µ deterministically picks a refer-
The definitions of memory indistinguishability need to take into account the reference labels, which determine the observability and integrity of references themselves. We give the new definition for Intuitively, the value or availability of a reference created at a program point is not affected by whether control reaches this point, because the reference itself does not exist if control does not reach the point. As a result, the typing rules in Figure 5 may be over-restrictive for reasoning about the security policies of a reference created at run time. For example, consider the following code: 
6.2.3. Example: TCP handshake protocol. The TCP connection establishment process uses a three-step handshake protocol [26] . First, a client host sends a Ë AE´ µ packet that contains the address of host to a server ×. Second, the server sends a Ë AE Ã packet to host . Third, host sends an Ã or ÊËÌ packet to the server, depending on whether is . An instance of this protocol can be simulated by the following code, in which message communications are modeled by assignments:
The reference Ñ represents the connection request from . After the request is received, a new reference Ü Ò is created to capture the availability requirement of the server: the protocol will terminate if the client does not fail, which is specified by the availability label × of Ü Ò . The statement Ñ Ñ represents the third step of the handshake protocol, and the reference Ñ represents the response from . Intuitively, the availability of Ñ only depends on , and thus we suppose that the availability label of Ñ is × . Then the above code is not well-typed because × × . Interestingly, this reflects the problem with the handshake protocol that allows the SYN flooding attack: host may be spoofed and cannot be trusted to establish the connection between × and .
Related work
There has been much research on ensuring high availability of a computer platform, or guaranteeing a server to carry out the computation requests from clients. Most of these work falls in two main categories: one is aimed at tolerating server-side failures, usually by using some replication techniques [25, 17, 4] ; the other deals with faulty clients and defends denial of service attacks [31, 19, 13] . This work is concerned with the availability risks inherent to the computation that may process untrusted inputs, while the computation platform is assumed available.
Lamport first introduced the concepts of safety and liveness properties [15] . Being available is often characterized as a liveness property, which informally means "something good will eventually happen". In general, verifying whether a program will eventually produce an output is equivalent to solving the halting problem, and thus incomputable for a Turing-complete language. In this work, we propose a security model in which an availability policy can be enforced by a noninterference property [9] . It is well known that a noninterference property is not a property on traces [18] , and unlike safety or liveness properties, cannot be specified by a trace set. However, a noninterference property can be treated as a property on pairs of traces. For example, consider a trace pair Ì ½ Ì ¾ . It has the confidentiality noninterference property if the first elements of Ì ½ and Ì ¾ are distinguishable, or Ì ½ and Ì ¾ are indistinguishable to lowconfidentiality users. Therefore, a noninterference property can be represented by a set of trace pairs Ë, and a program satisfies the property if all the pairs of traces produced by the program belong to Ë. Interestingly, with respect to a trace pair, the confidentiality and integrity noninterference properties have the informal meaning of safety properties ("something bad will not happen"), and availability noninterference takes on the informal meaning of liveness.
Focardi and Gorrieri [8] provide a classification of security properties in the setting of a non-deterministic process algebra. In particular, the BNDC (bisimulation-based nondeducibility on compositions) property prevents attackers from affecting the availabilities of observable process actions. However, the BNDC property requires observational equivalence, making it difficult to separate the concerns for integrity and availability.
Yu and Gligor [31] develop a formal method for analyzing availability: a form of first-order temporal logic is used to specify safety and liveness constraints on the inputs and behaviors of a service, and then those constraints can be used to formally verify the availability guarantees of the service. The flexibility and expressiveness of first-order temporal logic come at a price: it is difficult to automate the verification process. The approach of formalizing and reasoning system constraints and guarantees in terms of logic resembles the rely-guarantee method [12] , which was also applied to analyzing cryptographic protocols by Guttman et al. [10] .
Lafrance and Mullins [14] define a semantic security property impassivity for preventing DoS attacks. Intuitively, impassivity means that low-cost actions cannot interfere with high-cost actions. In some sense, impassivity is an integrity noninterference property, if we treat low-cost as lowintegrity and high-cost as high-integrity. With the implicit assumption that high-cost actions may exhaust system resources and render a system unavailable, impassivity corresponds to one part of our notion of availability noninterference: low-integrity inputs cannot affect the availabilities of highly available outputs.
Li et al. [16] formalize the notion that highly available data does not depend on low-availability data. However, their definition is termination-insensitive [24] , which makes it inappropriate to model availability noninterference.
Volpano and Smith [29] introduce the notion of termination agreement, which requires two executions indistinguishable to low-confidentiality users to both terminate or both diverge. The integrity dual of termination agreement can be viewed as a special case of the availability noninterference in which termination is treated as the only output of a program.
Language-based information flow control techniques [7, 24, 30, 11, 32, 22, 3, 33] can be used to enforce noninterference. But they mainly dealt with confidentiality and integrity. Our work focuses on applying the security-typed language approach to enforcing availability policies. Myers and Liskov proposed the decentralized label model for specifying information flow policies [20] . This paper generalizes the DLM to provide a unified framework for specifying confidentiality, integrity and availability policies. The form of a combined security policy is an instance of an owned policy [5] , though we give a different semantics here.
Conclusions
This paper makes three contributions. First, it proposes a way to specify availability policies as an extension to the decentralized label model, including the added expressive power of conjunctive and disjunctive principals and a new semantics for policies and labels. Second, the paper presents a simple language that can explicitly specify security policies as type annotations and has a security type system to reason about end-to-end availability policies, along with confidentiality and integrity policies. Third, the paper formally defines an end-to-end availability property in terms of program traces and shows that the security type system enforces this property. As far as we know, this is the first security type system for reasoning about availability.
An important direction for future work is to apply this static availability analysis framework to multithreaded programming models, and develop a notion of possibilistic (or probabilistic) availability noninterference.
